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CROSSING OVER: WHY ATTORNEYS (AND 
JUDGES) SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CROSS-
EXAMINE WITNESSES REGARDING THEIR 




You are sitting in an empty bar (in a town you’ve never before visited), 
drinking a Bacardi with a soft-spoken acquaintance you barely know.  After 
an hour, a third individual walks into the tavern and sits by himself, and you 
ask your acquaintance who the new man is.  ―Be careful of that guy,‖ you 
are told.  ―He is a man with a past.‖  A few minutes later, a fourth person 
enters the bar; he also sits alone.  You ask your acquaintance who this new 
individual is.  ―Be careful of that guy, too,‖ he says.  ―He is a man with no 
past.‖  Which of these two people do you trust less?1 
You are a juror sitting in a courtroom (a place you’ve never visited), 
hearing an opening statement by a loud-mouthed lawyer you barely know.  
After an hour, a first witness walks into the courtroom and sits by himself 
on the witness stand.  The lawyer’s cross-examination of the witness im-
plies, ―Be careful of that guy.  He is an illegal alien.‖  A few minutes later, 
a second witness enters the courtroom; he also sits alone on the stand.  The 
lawyer’s cross-examination of the witness implies, ―Be careful of that guy.  
He cheats on his wife.‖  Which of these two people do you trust less?   
According to the recent opinion of one federal appellate court, the il-
legal alien is the answer, and the second line of interrogation is prohibited.  
In United States v. Almeida-Perez,2 the Eighth Circuit found that an exten-
sive interrogation into the immigration statuses of defense witnesses was 
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that found that the way individuals enter this country is relevant to their 
character for truthfulness.3  In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit al-
so acknowledgedbut was ultimately unpersuaded byan analogous Ele-
venth Circuit decision.4  The Eleventh Circuit found that a district court 
erred when it allowed the State to question three defense witnesses about a 
letter written by the defendant/appellant, which proposed an adulterous liai-
son, because the letter did ―not directly relate to the Appellant's truthfulness 
and honesty.‖5  The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was in line with precedent 
from across the country, which generally holds that witnesses cannot be 
impeached through acts of misconduct unless such acts bear directly on 
their truth-telling capacity; evidence that a witness has engaged in unlawful 
trespass, the act most similar to entering this country illegally, cannot be 
used to impeach the witness under such cases.6 
This Essay argues that courts err when finding that witnesses can have 
their character for honesty impeached through cross-examination regarding 
their immigration statuses.  First, immigration status, in and of itself, does 
not directly bear upon (dis)honesty.  Second, even if immigration status 
does have sufficient bearing on witness honesty, the probative value of im-
migration interrogation is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice that it introduces.  Finally, if an attorney seeks to impeach a wit-
ness based upon his immigration status or his alleged commission of some 
immigration-related crime, such as fraudulently obtaining documentation, 
the witness should be able to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
I. IMPEACHMENT’S REACH 
Unless a witness has been convicted of a certain category of crime, his 
character for honesty generally may only be impeached through opinion and 
reputation testimony and not through testimony concerning specific in-
stances of (mis)conduct.  For instance, after a defendant testifies in his trial 
for a crime such as arson or assault, the State could call a witness to testify 
that he has been the defendant’s neighbor for ten years and that (1) in his 
opinion, the defendant is a liar and/or that (2) the defendant has a reputation 
in the neighborhood for being a liar.  The prosecution witness could not, 
however, testify about those acts that constitute the basis for his opinion.  In 
other words, if this prosecution witness thinks the defendant is a liar be-
cause he believes or has knowledge that the defendant committed embez-
zlement, the witness is nevertheless prohibited from testifying concerning 
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Federal Rules of Evidence 608(a) and (b) explain this dichotomy.  In 
relevant part, Rule 608(a) states that ―[t]he credibility of a witness may be 
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation . . . 
.‖7  Conversely, Rule 608(b) begins by stating that in ―attacking or support-
ing the witness’s character for truthfulness [specific instances of a witness’s 
conduct], other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence.‖8   
But Rule 608(b) goes on to state that:  
 
[I]n the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, [specific instances of conduct may] be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) con-
cerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has testified.9 
 
In other words, if defense counsel responded to the prosecution witness 
by calling its own witness to testify that, in his opinion, the embezzling de-
fendant is honest, the State could ask that witness on cross-examination 
whether he knew or had heard that the defendant committed embezzlement.  
Pursuant to the Rule, however, the State remains unable to prove the act in 
question through extrinsic evidence (in other words, with evidence from 
another witness or document); it is bound by the witness’s response.   
Moreover, once the defendant’s character is at issue, the State may ask 
the defendant directly whether he committed embezzlement.  The problem 
with this tactic is that Rule 608(b) ends by cautioning: ―[t]he giving of tes-
timony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as 
a waiver of the accused’s or the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination 
when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character for 
truthfulness.‖10  Assuming, therefore, that he is not on trial for the embez-
zlement alleged, the defendant could invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege 
if questioned about the matter.11  The defense witness, by contrast, cannot 
―plead the Fifth‖ because his testimony about the defendant’s embezzle-
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II. IMMIGRATION INTERROGATION 
In United States v. Almeida-Perez, the Eighth Circuit case referenced 
above, José and Porfirio Almeida-Perez appealed their convictions for being 
illegal aliens in possession of firearms transported in interstate commerce.13  
They alleged, among other things, that the judge (rather than the prosecutor) 
improperly badgered defense witnesses14 concerning the defendants’ immi-
gration statuses.15  The Eighth Circuit denied their appeal, relying upon 
―two cases in which unlawful entry into the country or other violation of 
immigration laws was considered admissible because relevant to truthful-
ness.‖16 
In addition to the two courts issuing the opinions relied upon by the 
Eighth Circuit, many other courts, both state and federal, would have 
reached the same conclusion.17  The Supreme Court of Wyoming in Mar-
quez v. State,18 provides one example.  In Marquez, Oscar Rodriguez Mar-
quez appealed from first-degree assault and assault and battery convictions, 
claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly allowed him to be im-
peached based upon illegal alien status.19  The court denied his appeal, curt-
ly concluding that Marquez’s status as an illegal alien was probative of his 
character for truthfulness and that Marquez had ―not directed us to any legal 
authority which would persuade us otherwise.‖20 
The Second Circuit in United States v. Cambindo Valencia,21 provides 
another example.  In Cambindo Valencia, the defendant appealed from his 
convictions, which related to a conspiracy to commit narcotics offenses, 
claiming, inter alia, that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor 
to cross-examine him about whether he had a green card.22  The district 
court permitted such interrogation, finding that it bore upon the defendant’s 
credibility; the Second Circuit affirmed, simply concluding that the ques-
tioning was proper.23 
Conversely, other courts, such as the United States District Court for 
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witnesses based upon their immigration statuses because of the lack of an 
established link between such status and credibility.25  According to these 
courts, individuals enter the United States for a variety of reasons and under 
a variety of circumstances.  Thus, ―[a]n individual’s status as an alien, legal 
or otherwise, . . . does not entitle [the government] to brand him a liar.‖26  
Still other courts have held that a witness cannot be impeached solely based 
upon his status as an illegal alien, but may be impeached if the witness has 
committed some immigration-related crime, such as falsifying his identity.27 
III. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER 
To determine which courts are acting correctly, we must consider the 
types of conduct typically covered by Rule 608(b).  As the text of the Rule 
reveals, attorneys may cross-examine witnesses only regarding acts that are 
probative of (un)truthfulness.28  Although courts vary somewhat in enume-
rating what those acts are, many courts, including the Second and Eighth 
Circuits, hold that Rule 608(b) only permits inquiry into specific acts ―re-
lated to crimen falsi, e.g., perjury, subornation of perjury, false statement, 
embezzlement, [or] false pretenses‖ that could lead to arrest.29  Most illegal 
immigrants enter the country without inspection,30 meaning that the act of 
illegal entry is usually not an act relating to crimen falsi because it does not 
involve deceit of or false statements to government officials or bodies.  It 
follows that the opinions in Almeida-Perez and Cambindo Valencia, which 
made no reference to the impeached witnesses’ use of lies or deceit to enter 
this country, were wrongly rendered because the courts issuing those opi-
nions otherwise only allow impeachment based upon acts of deception. 
Some courts have held that Rule 608(b) permits inquiry into a broader 
range of acts, such as property crimes.  For instance, in State v. Williams, 
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee reversed an appellant’s armed 
robbery conviction after concluding that the trial judge erred when he prec-





  See Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp. 203, 207–08 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (link). 
26
  Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1989) (link). 
27
  See, e.g., EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  According to the 
court, it is only such acts of deceit, and not their connection with immigration status, that can be elicited 
during cross-examination.  See id. 
28
  FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
29
  United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1987) (link); see Martin v. Nat’l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8381(RLE), 1998 WL 575183, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1998) (construing 
Rule 608(b) narrowly in accordance with United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
30
  See, e.g., Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law Enforce-
ment in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 332 n.43 (2005). 
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to an act of larceny the witness had allegedly committed.31  The court simp-
ly found that ―[l]arceny is a bad act constituting dishonesty.‖32   
Even the courts that read Rule 608 broadly, however, find that trespass, 
the act most similar to entering the country illegally,33 is not an act involv-
ing dishonesty or false statement.  Accordingly, they hold such activity is 
beyond the scope of Rule 608(b).  To wit, in State v. Philpott, a Tennessee 
trial court found that ―[c]riminal trespass is not a crime involving dishones-
ty or false statement.‖34  Later, recognizing the similarity between illegally 
entering this country and trespassing, the same Tennessee appellate court 
that found larceny to be a crime of dishonesty relied upon Philpott in find-
ing that a trial court properly precluded a defendant from interrogating a 
witness regarding his illegal work status.35  Conversely, no court has ex-
plained how immigration status is a proper subject for impeachment while 
trespassing is not, nor has any court provided anything more than a cursory 
comment ―to support the conclusion that the status of being an illegal alien 
impugns one’s credibility.‖36  This lack of sound reasoning is particularly 
disturbing given that there are reasons even beyond the plain language of 
Rule 608(b) for excluding inquires into a witness’s illegal alien status. 
IV. DIVIDE AND PREJUDICE 
Even if cross-examination regarding a witness’s immigration status 
was sufficiently relevant on the issue of (un)truthfulness under Rule 608(b), 
a court would still have to foreclose such inquiry if: (1) its probative value 
were substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Rule 403, 
and/or (2) it were necessary to protect the witness from harassment or un-
due embarrassment under Rule 611(a).37  Indeed, in Almeida-Perez, the 
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migration violation to character for truthfulness is at the least debatable,‖ 
and on the other that ―the use of such evidence is fraught with the danger of 
prejudice to a defendant by introducing the possibility of invidious discrim-
ination on the basis of alienage.‖38  Although the Eighth Circuit ultimately 
found that the immigration interrogation in the case before it navigated the 
Rule 403 tightrope,39 it should not have done so based upon the tendency of 
such questioning to divide and prejudice jurors against the illegal alien.40 
In making its decision that immigration interrogation is not reversible 
error, the Eighth Circuit relied on precedent from the First and Second Cir-
cuits.  The First Circuit case, United States v. Cardales, is a 1999 opinion in 
which the appellate court found that the district court did not err by allow-
ing the prosecution to impeach the defendant’s character based on its inter-
rogation into his unlawful entry into Puerto Rico.41  That opinion failed to 
reference Rule 403.  The Eighth Circuit thus would have been better served 
relying upon the First Circuit’s 2004 opinion in United States v. Amaya-
Manzanares because, unlike Cardales, Amaya-Manzanares actually ad-
dressed the prejudicial effect of immigration interrogation.42   
Amaya-Manzanares illustrates the unfair prejudicial effect of immigra-
tion interrogation.  The Amaya-Manzanares court reversed a defendant’s 
conviction for false use of a green card, finding that the district court erred 
by failing to consider such effect under the Rule 403 balancing test before 
allowing the prosecution to cross-examine him regarding his unlawful entry 
into the United States.43  In reversing, the First Circuit acknowledged that 
Amaya’s unlawful entry was relevant to the question of whether the green 
card was false because such entry would make ―it more likely that the card 
is false than it would be without evidence of such entry; after all, an unlaw-
ful entrant would have use for a false green card, while a lawful entrant 
would have a far better chance of qualifying for a valid card.‖44  Nonethe-
less, the court found that ―[n]o sensible judge would be likely to let in the 
unlawful entry evidence to show falsity‖45 because, among other things:  
 
Proof of Amaya’s unlawful entry is prejudicial in the sense 
intended by Rule 403.  This is not because it hurts 
Amaya—all relevant evidence by the government does 
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might encourage the jury to dislike or disapprove of the de-
fendant independent of the merits.46 
 
Some courts also have found that immigration interrogation violates 
Rule 403 and/or Rule 611(a) when the party impeached is a civil plaintiff.  
For example, one case in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York proscribed a defendant-employer from inquiring into 
the immigration status of a former employee who sued the company for 
employment discrimination.47  In so doing, the court affirmed the findings 
of a magistrate judge who had concluded that the probative value of such 
interrogation would be substantially outweighed by the harm it would cause 
by ―discouraging illegal alien workers from litigating unlawful discrimina-
tion and other employment-related claims for fear that [being forced to] 
publicly disclos[e] their unlawful presence in this country would subject 
them to deportation proceedings . . . .‖48 
Other opinions illustrate the divisive nature of immigration interroga-
tion.  For instance, in Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, an undocumented immi-
grant brought a personal injury action against a scaffolding contractor, and 
the trial court allowed the defendant to question the plaintiff and his brother 
regarding the plaintiff’s immigration status at length.49  The Court of Ap-
peals of Washington deemed this decision to be erroneous, concluding that 
―[t]he issue of immigration status is divisive and prejudicial.‖50  Because 
immigration interrogation is lacking in probative value and has this tenden-
cy to divide and prejudice jurors, courts should preclude it, even if it is war-
ranted under Rule 608(a). 
V. IMMIGRATION INCRIMINATION 
Although most illegal immigrants enter this country without engaging 
in acts that might be construed as constituting crimen falsi, in some cases, 
immigrants do illegally enter this country through the use of some type of 
deceit or false statement; in other cases, immigrants not only enter this 
country illegally, but also commit some further immigration-related crime 
that has direct bearing upon their honesty.  For instance, in the previously 
mentioned Marquez opinion, the defendant not only entered the country il-
legally but also used a false Social Security number.51  Although in one 
sense such acts of crimen falsi present a stronger argument for impeach-
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the interrogator faces a common obstacle under the Rule in any of the 
above-mentioned scenarios: the Fifth Amendment.  If an attorney or judge 
seeks to impeach a witness based upon his immigration status or his alleged 
commission of an immigration-related crime of dishonesty (and that witness 
is not the subject of a deportation proceeding or a criminal defendant facing 
charges for one of those alleged crimes),52 the witness should53 be able to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Rule 
608(b) ends by cautioning that ―the giving of testimony, whether by an ac-
cused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused’s 
or the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination when examined with re-
spect to matters that relate only to character for truthfulness.‖54  
When asked about his immigration status or one of these honesty-
related crimes, an illegal alien should be able to invoke his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination55 because his response would 
create a ―real and appreciable‖ hazard of incrimination and prosecution that 
is not ―so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence 
his conduct.‖56  Indeed, in an Advisory Opinion issued on January 30, 2009, 
the Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee instructed judges not to inquire in-
to a defendant’s immigration status at either a bail or sentencing hearing be-
cause a defendant who entered the country illegally can be subject to 
criminal penalties, triggering the Fifth Amendment privilege.57  
CONCLUSION 
As the Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee noted in its recent Advi-
sory Opinion, ―[i]t is public knowledge that there are millions of illegal 
aliens in the United States and that the issues arising from that fact are con-
troversial, high-profile, and perceived by members of the public as involv-
ing national origin, race, and socioeconomic status.‖58  This Essay opened 
by asking whether a prospective juror should trust an illegal alien less than 
an adulterer.  According to courts allowing for immigration interrogation, 
the illegal alien is less deserving of a juror’s trust.  But are these decisions 
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54
  FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (link). 
55
  See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment applies to non-resident aliens on trial in the United States) (link). 
56
  See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599–600 (1896) (link). 
57
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58
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upon illegal immigrants actually being less trustworthy than those who have 
committed adultery, trespass, and other acts held to be non-deceitful?   
Data shows that most illegal immigrants come to this country to work 
and to reunify their families.59  You are a juror.  The lawyer’s cross-
examination of a first witness implies, ―Be careful of that guy.  He is an il-
legal alien.  He is trying to provide for and pull together his family.‖  The 
lawyer’s cross-examination of a second witness implies, ―Be careful of that 
guy.  He cheats on his wife.  He is tearing his family apart.‖  Which of these 
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